I. Introduction and Outline of the Analysis
The U.S. dollar is extremely useful as a means of payment and a unit of account. This convenience motivates people to use the dollar as a basis for spot agreements as well as for long-term contracts. But if inflation is uncertain, then there are risks associated with the specification of obligations in terms of dollars. These risks, which have been substantial in recent years, affect the equilibrium interest rates on financial assets and the required expected returns from physical investments. In particular, to the extent that people lack information about future price levels, they will find it risky to undertake long-term projects. Hence, uncertainty about inflation tends to retard investment and to distort the allocation of resources across sectors of the economy.
Futures contracts in price indices would alleviate some of the adverse consequences from inflation. First, the existence of these futures markets would provide a convenient means for people to hedge the risks from inflation. In particular, an investor in a long-term project would not also have to be a speculator on inflation. Second, the price quotes on these markets would be a useful source of information, which would allow people to calculate accurately the real value of their dollar-denominated contracts. There is some evidence that the availability of these instruments would encourage investment and reduce the mean real rate of return on long-term bonds. Indexed bonds-which are now significant in Britainserve a similar purpose. In the absence of such bonds, there would be a market for price-index futures, although the volume of trading would probably be modest.
This study analyzes the role of price-index futures in an environment of volatile inflation and interest rates. Section II discusses the predictability of inflation in the U.S. economy. Notably, there is evidence that inflation uncertainty is substantial and has increased since the early 1970s. Section III relates the uncertainty of inflation to the observed volatility in nominal interest rates. One conclusion is that the volatility in interest rates has dramatically increased the risk from holding dollardenominated long-term bonds. This extra risk explains the substantial recent interest in long-term interest rates relative to short-term rates.
Section IV analyzes how the introduction of price-index futures would affect equilibrium real interest rates. There is also a discussion of the beneficial effects of this futures market on investment. Finally, by looking at the net position of various sectors in nominally denominated assets and liabilities, there is some indication of the sources of hedging demand for consumer price index (CPI) futures. Nonfinancial businesses, insurance companies, pension funds, and households are potential participants, whereas a variety of financial institutions would seem to be more interested in interest-rate futures.
Section V points out that futures contracts on price indices are analogous to index bonds. Thus it is useful to study the recent experience of the United Kingdom with indexed financial instruments. That experiment shows a significant level of demand, especially from pension funds. However, there is a limited volume of trading in these assets.
Sections VI and VII document some of the adverse effects from uncertain inflation and from the underlying behavior of monetary policy. Specifically, the unpredictability of aggregate money and prices tends to go along with greater dispersion of actual and expected inflation across markets. This dispersion leads in turn to adverse effects on such macroeconomic variables as output, employment, and investment. The results suggest that the implementation of a futures market in price indices (or a market in indexed bonds) would have beneficial effects on these macro variables.
Finally, Section VIII considers some general criticisms of futures markets. There is no evidence that these markets divert capital from productive enterprises; rather, the indication is that futures markets foster information flows and thereby improve the allocation of resources. Similarly, the positive association between price volatility and the volume of futures trading reflects reverse causation. More price volatility motivates an increase in the extent of futures trading, which then has some moderating influence on price volatility.
II. The Predictability of Inflation
When people enter into contracts that fix obligations in nominal terms, a change in the price level alters the real value of these obligations. For example, the real value of a nominally denominated bond is affected by inflation. To the extent that inflation is predictable, the fixing of contracts in terms of dollars has no major economic consequences. Each party to the agreement would base his or her decision on the known real costs or benefits. In the case of bonds, people would know ex ante the real rate of interest-that is, the nominal rate less the rate of inflation-which then affects decisions to save and invest. However, to the extent that inflation is unpredictable, the real value of obligations will be uncertain. In order to see how important this element is, I examine first the degree to which U.S. inflation has been predictable.
Fama and others' have measured the information that interest rates and other variables contain about future inflation. Table 1 shows the general nature of these types of results for regression equations with annual data from the post-World War II period. For 1953-71, the interest rate (on government issues with 1-year maturity) has roughly a one-to-one relation to subsequent inflation (based on the CPI without the shelter component). The coefficient of the interest rate in row 1 of the table is .82 (SE = .15). Adding lagged values of inflation and monetary growth (MI) in row 2 eliminates the interest rate as a significant variable (contrary to Fama). This finding indicates that there are systematic variations over time in expected real interest rates. The standard-error-of-estimate in row 2 is &r = 0.9%, which suggests a relatively low forecast error for 1-year-ahead inflation.
After 1971 the interest rate is not useful as a predictor of inflation (rows 5 and 6 of the table). Also, even with the lags of inflation and monetary growth included, the error variance for inflation is greater than before (a' = .015, versus the earlier value of .009). Thus two points emerge from these results. First, in recent years market interest rates are not helpful for predicting inflation, and, second, using other variables such as lagged inflation and monetary growth, the prediction error for inflation is substantially higher than it used to be. while the mean of the standard deviation of the survey responses across the participants is 0.6%. For 1973-85, the mean of expected inflation is 6.1% with a mean standard deviation of 1.7%. The tripling in the average standard deviation-from 0.6% to 1.7%-indicates that greater differences of opinion about future inflation have accompanied the increased forecasting variance for inflation (as well as the rise in mean inflation). Although this association is not inevitable, it is to be expected that greater overall volatility of inflation would go along with a greater diversity of opinion. Thus the Livingston data reinforce the conclusion that problems with forecasting future prices have become much more serious in recent years.
III. Inflation Risk and Asset Returns
The recent volatility of inflation has been associated with a great increase in the volatility of nominal interest rates. Table 3 The increased volatility of nominal interest rates can have an important effect on the required average real rate of return on nominally denominated assets. Note first that an increase in the short-term rate of interest tends to lower the price of long-term bonds. Thereby, the yield on long-term bonds remains competitive with the new higher yield on short bonds. Further, these effects are particularly strong if the increase in current short-term interest rates signals that future short-term rates are also likely to be higher. This connection arises if either higher inflation or higher real interest rates tend to persist over time. Then a surprise increase in short-term interest rates-due either to higher expected inflation or to higher real rates-tends to go along with low (perhaps negative) realized returns on holdings of long-term bonds.
The effect on the risk premium on bonds depends on whether increases in nominal interest rates-for example, those due to unexpected inflation-tend to go along with good or bad economic times. If with good times, then bonds do badly in good times and vice versa, which is a desirable property that is consistent with a low mean real rate of return on bonds. But if unexpected increases in nominal interest rates correlate with bad times, then bonds would require a risk premium. Further, given this last pattern of correlation, a greater volatility of interest rates means a larger risk premium.
The standard view until the early 1970s was that high unexpected inflation went along with an economic boom. This association arises in some "Phillips Curve" theories, in which monetary expansions (or some other shocks to aggregate demand) raise both output and prices. But "supply shocks," such as the recent oil crises, tend to lower output while raising the price level. Further, as discussed by Friedman (1977) and documented statistically by Fair (1979, table 3), this type of shock has been dominant in the last decade. Hence, in the present environment, the real return on dollar-denominated assets tends to be good in good times (when inflation is low and output is high) and bad in bad times. This pattern means that these assets now require a risk premium.
Bodie, Kane, and McDonald (1983) have tested part of this hypothesis by observing the covariance between returns on bonds and returns on stocks. They show that the recent rise in yields on long-term bonds can be attributed to the volatility of their real returns. Until 1977 they estimate the premium of long-term bonds over short-term bonds to be near zero. But the recent volatility of interest rates has made long-term bonds so risky that the required excess return rose to about 4 percentage points per year in 1980-82.
It should be possible to estimate the risk premium on bonds by observing the covariance of the real returns with a direct measure of well-being, such as the growth of consumption per person. So far I have been unsuccessful in pinning down this covariance, using monthly or quarterly date since 1977. It may be that the monthly data are insufficiently accurate and that there are not enough quarterly observations (since 1977) to get precise estimates.
IV. Consequences from the Introduction of CPI Futures
The previous discussion indicates that a holder of a nominal bond will require an inflation risk premium if his or her welfare is low in the same states of nature that inflation is surprisingly high. If this person's welfare is low when there is high inflation only because he or she is a net holder of nominal assets, then the existence of CPI futures will permit this person to eliminate the effect of inflation on his or her well-being. To the extent that a person can perfectly insulate well-being (i.e., real consumption) from inflation, he or she will no longer require a risk premium on nominal bonds in order to hold them. That is, the covariance between real consumption changes and the real return on bonds (short or long term) can be reduced to zero because this covariance depends only on the covariance between inflation and consumption changes. The latter will be zero when the person uses CPI futures to insulate completely his or her consumption changes from inflation risk. If this person is the marginal person holding, say, Treasury bills, then it follows that the real yield on bills will fall because of the introduction of CPI futures. Even stronger effects can operate on long-term interest rates. However, it is unclear at this point whether the "marginal person" -in the sense of the person relevant for determination of interest rates-is net long or short on nominally denominated assets. As indicated before, a person will be hurt by inflation if he or she is a net holder of nominal assets-that is, if the assets with payoffs fixed in dollars exceed the liabilities. Note that for every person with a net credit position there is someone with a net debt position (at least if we include foreigners and the government in the calculations). Thus there will always be balancing gains and losses from unanticipated inflation. However, when people engage in nominally denominated contracts, the randomness of future inflation creates risk because no one knows in advance whether inflation will be higher or lower than anticipated and thus whether he or she will end up realizing gains or losses. This risk has adverse effects on the economic activities, especially long-term investments, in which people are willing to engage. Since CPI futures would eliminate the risks of inflation, they would also spur the types of economic activities that otherwise entail these risks. For example, Milton and Rose Friedman (1984, p. 104) argue that "futures markets in price indexes seem to us the single private-market development that will do the most to reduce the harm from uncertain and unstable inflation. They will provide a mechanism that will enable long-range projects to be undertaken despite the uncertainty of inflation, that will enable ordinary people to protect their assets despite that uncertainty."
In order to see how important this type of effect is likely to be, I made a rough estimate of the extent to which various broad groups of the population were holders of net nominal assets or net nominal liabilities. The results appear in table 4, which is based on the Federal Reserve's Flow-of-Funds Accounts for December 1981. At the highest level of aggregation, the households and life insurance/pension funds were net holders of nominal assets to the extent of $1.84 trillion. The nominal debtors were the federal government ($710 billion), state and local governments ($120 billion), and nonfinancial business ($1.02 trillion). Various financial intermediaries had a nearly balanced position with respect to nominal assets and liabilities. In this category are commercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual saving banks, credit unions, finance companies, and money-market funds. However, these institutions tend to be imbalanced with respect to the term structure of nominal interest rates since their assets are typically long-term relative to their liabilities. Table 4 misses some nominal assets and liabilities in the form of wage agreements and other promised payments for materials. Also, the level of aggregation is too high to pick out individual firms or households whose positions differ from the aggregate of their sectors. For This shape for the term structure indicates that the market expects real rates to fall in the future. The pattern of increase in real interest rates from 1981 to 1985 corresponds roughly to that in the United States-in fact, given an international capital market, the observed real interest rates on index-linked bonds in the United Kingtom tell us something about the implicit expected real yields on long-term U.S. government bonds.5 That is, the British data on real interest rates may enable us to infer expected rates of inflation in the United States.
As for quantities, the amount of index-linked gilts issued in the United Kingdom from March 1981 through June 1985 was ?9.0 billion in market value, which is 22% of the public sector borrowing requirement over that period. In terms of the total stock of marketable government bonds outstanding, the index-linked gilts accounted for about 8% in June 1985. Interestingly, the main infusion of index-linked bonds occurred during a period of declining inflation rates (the rate of change of consumer prices was about 5% for 1983-84, as compared to an average rate of 10% for 1980-82).
In terms of market acceptance, the indexed bonds now occupy a significant position in the British financial picture. However, there has been little trading activity in these instruments. It is reasonable to conjecture that a similar degree of market interest would greet the issue of indexed bonds by the U.S. government. In the absence of such issues, a private market in price-index futures would meet a similar purpose. Therefore, they would have some market interest but probably not a great deal of trading volume.
3. Because the index linking involves a lag of 8 months, the real yield on these bonds is not entirely certain in advance. The indexed gilts have a tax advantage over the nonindexed ones because the indexation is free of income tax, whereas the inflation component of the nominal rate is subject to tax. (All gilts are free of capital-gains tax if held for more than 1 year.) However, the differences with respect to income tax do not apply to pension funds-the major holders of gilts-because they are free of income tax.
4. The information in this section comes from Rutherford (1983) , from data provided by Charles Goodhart and Geoffrey Wood, and from Buckmaster & Moore (1985) .
5. But, since the U.S. bonds are not indexed, they differ in risk characteristics from the indexed British bonds. There are also differences in tax treatment between the American and British instruments. In some recent research on the weekly data from fall 1979 to fall 1982, I find that, in addition to the effect from MI announcements, yields on Treasury bills and 20-year government bonds respond inversely to the movements in the monetary base from the previous 2 weeks. Thus there is apparently a short-lived "liquidity effect" from changes in high-powered money. These results may be consistent with the transactions-based monetary theory in Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984) . Further, in the more recent data for 1983, the effect of money announcements on interest rates has weakened. This observation may be associated with another shift of monetary policy, this time away from the targeting of monetary aggregates. In any event, this behavior goes along with a reduction in the volatility of interest rates for 1983-84.
VI. Consumer Price Index Futures and Real Effects from the

VIII. Criticisms of Futures Markets
One common objection to futures and options markets-which might apply as a particular case to price-index futures-is that these activities draw capital away from "productive enterprises." (Similar attacks have been made against corporate mergers.) Of course, there is no direct effect of futures/options trading on the aggregate of available credit. That is, these markets do not involve a net position, long or short, in assets. Rather, there would have to be indirect effects on the allocation of resources across sectors, or on the overall desire to save, or on the aggregate demand for investment, and so on.
To the extent that organized futures trading provides a convenient vehicle for hedging or sharpens the available price signals, there would be beneficial real effects on economic activity. The possibility to lay off risks-notably, those from inflation-would spur investment demand. Also, there would be a general channeling of activity toward the most productive areas rather than toward those that happened to entail low inflation risk or that had rapid payoffs, and so on. Corresponding to the economic gains, there would be some real resources used up in the process of organizing futures markets and in the time spent by traders. But through the usual functioning of the private economy, the amounts of these efforts would be related to the social product of the activity. That is, economically inefficient ("excessive") trading activity tends not to have survival value.6 If anything, the tendency is for organizers of markets to be unable to capture the full social returns from their activities. For example, as stressed by Grossman (1977) , people can free ride on the valuable price information that is generated by futures markets. Hence the number of organized markets-and specifically the varieties of futures contracts available-tends to be fewer than is socially optimal.
Another frequent criticism is that futures markets have themselves led to volatility in the prices of the underlying goods or, more recently, of interest rates, stock prices, and so on. However, in a direct test for six commodities, Cox (1976) 6. The presence of speculators who may like gambling does not alter the argument. First, the utility gained from gambling is as good as any other type of utility. Second, as discussed in Telser (1981, pp. 9 ff.), the existence of these speculators tends to lower the average price paid by others.
7. Carlton shows also that government regulation has an important independent effect on the number of futures markets and on trading volume.
